Child Victims of Sexual Abuse: Balancing a Child\u27s Trauma against the Defendant\u27s Confrontation Rights – Coy v. Iowa by Marchese, Claudia L.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 6 Issue 1 Article 23 
1990 
Child Victims of Sexual Abuse: Balancing a Child's Trauma 
against the Defendant's Confrontation Rights – Coy v. Iowa 
Claudia L. Marchese 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
Claudia L. Marchese, Child Victims of Sexual Abuse: Balancing a Child's Trauma against the Defendant's 
Confrontation Rights – Coy v. Iowa, 6 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 411 (1990). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol6/iss1/23 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
NOTE
CHILD VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE:




Child abuse,' particularly sexual abuse,2 is a problem that has risen to
epidemic proportions in today's society.' Although child abuse is recog-
nized as a pervasive wrong,' its incidence continues to increase.5
Despite the fact that states have increased staff and agencies to combat the
problem of increased abuse,6 the conviction rate for abusers is strikingly
low.7 Compared to other crimes, child abuse is exceptionally difficult to dis-
1. Child abuse is defined as "Any form of cruelty to a child's physical, moral or mental
well being." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 217 (5th ed. 1979). The term is also used to describe
a form of sexual attack which may or may not amount to rape. These acts are criminal of-
fenses in most states. Id.
2. Sexual abuse has been defined as "the utilization of the child for sexual gratification or
an adult's permitting another adult to so use the child." R. GEISER, HIDDEN VICTIMs 7
(1979). It has also been defined as "forced, pressured, or stressful sexual behavior committed
on a person under the age of 17." A. BURGESS, A. GROTH, L. HOLSTROM, & S. SGOI, SEXUAL
ASSAULT OF CHILDREN & ADOLESCENTS xi (1978).
3. Child abuse reports nationwide increased by nine percent in the first half of 1985,
according to a study by the Chicago-based National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse.
The data suggested a projected figure of 1.793 million abused and neglected children for 1985.
In the subcategory of child sexual abuse, statistics indicated a 24 percent increase in 1985.
Fuller, Child Abuse Rises, A.B.A. J. 34 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter Child Abuse Rises]. See gener-
ally Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977 (1969).
4. "Sexual activity with children is prohibited by custom in all known societies and is
illegal in every state of this country ... regardless of the degree or type of coercion by the
adult, or accommodation by the victim." Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child
Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 125, 126 (1984).
5. See Child Abuse Rises, supra note 3. See also A Hidden Epidemic, NEWSWEEK, May
14, 1984, at 30. The article states that the problem is so widespread that "somewhere between
100,000 and 500,000 American children will be [sexually] molested this year." Id. at 31.
6. The National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse's 1985 semiannual report
revealed that 33 states increased their agency staff or services in the prevention of child abuse
but that child abuse remains a serious problem in society. Child Abuse Rises, supra note 3.
7. There are many problems involved in child victimization and the child's role in prose-
cuting the perpetrators of such crimes. For example, child victims are often easily accessible to
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cover and ultimately to prosecute.' The difficulty in prosecution stems from
the fact that there is just one witness to the crime - the child victim: the
child is likely to be viewed as an unreliable witness and could be severely
traumatized by the experience.9 Because of the problems attending the testi-
mony of children, a high percentage of child abuse cases are "either dis-
missed before trial or end in acquittals."'
In an effort to reduce the trauma for child victims in the courtroom" and
their abusers, who are frequently members of the child's family or are somehow acquainted
with the child. See State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 375, 389 N.W.2d 575, 579 (1986). The
fact that the perpetrator is rarely a stranger leads to a low percentage of actual assaults that are
even brought to the attention of authorities. Even when cases of sexual abuse are reported, few
are prosecuted. See D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A
CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 4 (1985).
8. Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987); State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super.
411, 417, 484 A.2d 1330, 1333 (1984) ("In most cases, prosecutions are abandoned or result in
generous plea agreements, either because the child's emotional condition prevents* her from
testifying or makes the testimony obviously inaccurate."); See also Warford, 223 Neb. at 373,
389 N.W.2d at 579. Oftentimes the prosecutor will decide not to prosecute because without
physical evidence the only evidence available is the child's testimony who "by the standards of
our adult legal system, [may] be perceived to be incompetent, unreliable or otherwise not credi-
ble as a witness." Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 4, at 126-27. The authors suggest four main
reasons why cases of sexual abuse of children are so difficult to prosecute. The first reason is
that adults are often "skeptical when children report having been molested." Id. The second
reason is that people "believe that sexual abuse is caused by a mental disorder and therefore
that the mental-health system, not the criminal justice [system] is the proper forum for dealing
with the matter." Id. The third reason is that many people fear that children will be further
victimized by the traumatic experience involved in legal proceedings. Finally, prosecutors are
hesitant to pursue a trial that rests heavily on the child victim's testimony because of their fear
that the child will not be a good witness. Id.
9. Avery, The Child Abuse Witness: Potential For Secondary Victimization, 7 CRIM.
JUST. J. 1 (1983); Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. at 411, 484 A.2d at 1334. See also Berliner &
Barbieri, supra note 4, at 127.
10. People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 1023, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977, 982 (1986). The court
stated "either the child cannot testify at all without having a total emotional breakdown or
their testimony in the strange setting of a courtroom in the presence of their victimizer is
hesitant, forgetful and inconsistent." Id. See State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654
(1982); Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984); Ordway, Proving Parent Child
Incest: Proof at Trial Without Testimony In Court By The Victim, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 131
(Fall 1981); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative
Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1985).
11. See Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is The Court a Protector or Perpetrator, 17
NEW ENG. L. REV. 643-45 (1982).
Criminal procedures that operate solely to vindicate a societal interest often fail to
take into account the psychological damage that can be done to a young child in the
role of witness. For example, a witness has no constitutional rights to protect him
through the ordeal of a criminal investigation, pre-trial proceedings, and the trial
itself. He has no right to counsel and no general right to remain silent even though
public testimony may do him considerable harm. In contrast the defendant is pro-
tected by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. While this balance
Coy v. Iowa
also increase the rate of prosecution of these crimes, many states have en-
acted statutes allowing alternative procedures for the presentation of the vic-
tim's testimony.12 Many of these remedies, however, have been challenged
as violating the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront a witness.
In several state cases, procedures implemented to protect the health of the
child have been found to be in conflict with the confrontation clause.' 3 The
first state case to address this narrow issue was the California Supreme
Court decision in Herbert v. Superior Court. 4 The United States Supreme
Court only recently considered the issue in January of 1988, in Coy v.
Iowa.' 
5
of rights may be appropriate when the complaining witness is an adult, a child victim
has a greater need for protection.
The child who is the victim of a sex crime provides a poignant example. While the
assault itself is emotionally damaging, the ordeal of bringing criminal charges can
compound the danger. Although juvenile offenders are treated in a different manner
than adult offenders, a child victim called to assist the prosecution of his or her
accused assailant is not.
Id. See also Libai, supra note 3, at 984.
Psychiatrists have identified components of the legal proceedings that are capable of
putting a child victim under prolonged mental stress and endangering his emotional
equilibrium: repeated interrogations and cross-examination; facing the accused again;
the official atmosphere in court; the acquittal of the accused for want of corroborat-
ing evidence to the child's trustworthy testimony; and the conviction of a molester
who is the child's parent or relative.
Id. (citations omitted).
12. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
4253(A)(Supp. 1986); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-86g (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-8-55 (Supp. 1987); HAW. R. EVID. § 616(d); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8(b) (Burns
Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14(1) (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3434(a)(1) (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1989); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-
102 (Supp. 1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS CH. § 278 16D (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 595.02(4) (West Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A32.4 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.30 (McKinney Supp.
1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(c) (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 22
753(B) (West Supp. 1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985 (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1986); TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. § 38.071(3) (Vernon
Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5(2) (Supp. 1989); VT. R. EVID. 807(e); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7) (West Supp. 1988).
13. See Wildermuth v. Maryland, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987); Commonwealth v.
Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d 366 (1988); State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 389
N.W.2d 575 (1986).
14. 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981). In Herbert, the defendant was
charged with oral copulation and lewd acts upon his five year old stepdaughter. At the prelim-
inary hearing, on the direction of the judge, the defendant was seated so that he could hear but
not see the witness. The court held that the defendant's confrontation right had been abridged
because the defendant and child could not view each other.
15. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
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In the six years between Herbert and Coy, several state courts upheld al-
ternative testimonial procedures to accommodate alleged child victims of
sexual abuse over defendant's arguments that the procedures violated the
confrontation clause. 16 The Court in Coy, however, held that a screen
placed between the child witness and the defendant to prevent the witness
from viewing the defendant while testifying was a violation of the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to confront a witness.17 Although the majority
of the Supreme Court struck down the procedure because it lacked the
"core" confrontation right to physically face witnesses at trial,'" Justice
O'Connor authored a concurrence that stressed the right to face-to-face con-
frontation may give way in an appropriate case to other competing interests
such as the protection of child witnesses. 9 The question now is how will the
decision in Coy affect the state statutes designed to protect child victims of
sexual abuse from trauma as well as the state court decisions upholding the
alternative procedures.
This Note discusses the traumatic effects that the courtroom experience,
absent protections or safeguards, may have on child victims of sexual
abuse.20 The Note also discusses the prior law surrounding the confronta-
tion clause and the specific stances various state courts have taken in at-
tempting to reduce the trauma child victims of sexual abuse experience in
the courtroom. The Note then analyzes the decision in Coy v. Iowa2 and its
16. Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981); Com-
monwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986); Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d
275 (1987); State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984); People v. Hender-
son, 132 Misc. 2d 51, 509 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1986); People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d. 1016, 498
N.Y.S.2d 977 (1986); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987).
17. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the state court. On
remand, the Iowa Supreme Court was forced to reverse Coy's conviction because it could not
determine that the error found by the Supreme Court was harmless. The girls' testimony,
which was stricken by the Supreme Court's order, was the only direct evidence available to
prove the elements of the case. The Iowa Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court
for a new trial. State v. Coy, 433 N.W.2d 714 (1988).
18. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
19. Id. at 2803 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. The author recognizes that a criminal prosecution for the alleged sexual assault of a
child often causes all those involved some form of trauma. For instance, the adult who is on
trial, whether innocent or guilty, faces the possibility of a prison term, public stigma and alien-
ation from family members and friends. This Note is limited to the narrow issue of the experi-
ence young child victims of sexual abuse endure in the courtroom, and the balancing of a
defendant's confrontation right with efforts to use alternative testimonial procedures to reduce
any trauma children may be subjected to. For a discussion of the problem of child sexual
abuse focusing on the adult defendant's perspective see O'Brien, Pedophilia: The Legal Predic-
ament Of Clergy, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 91 (1988).
21. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
Coy v. Iowa
possible implications on the many state legislative acts and judicial decisions
designed to reduce the psychological damage to young victims.
I. THE TRAUMA EXPERIENCED BY CHILD VICTIMS AS WITNESSES
Aside from the initial abuse, the experience of the courtroom procedure
often adds to the trauma child victims of sexual abuse suffer.22 It is well
documented that the trial process can be very traumatic for a child sexual
abuse victim.2"
Testifying in a courtroom in the presence of the defendant is often an
"extremely intimidating experience" for the child witness.2 4 Studies by
mental health professionals have shown that a child victim's involvement in
"legal proceedings can have a profoundly disturbing effect on the mental and
emotional health" of the child.25 "Stigma, embarrassment and trauma to
the child, sometimes with lifelong ramifications, are increased by involve-
ment in the [current] judicial system. '"26
22. See Harshbarger, Botsford & Kepler, Prosecuting Child Abuse Cases in Middlesex
County, 30 BOSTON B.J. 7 (Mar./Apr. 1986) [hereinafter Harshbarger, Botsford & Kepler];
Goodman, The Child Witness: An Introduction, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs 1 (1984); Avery, The Child
Witness: Potential for Secondary Victimization, 7 CRIM. JUST. J. 3 (1983).
23. Harshbarger, Botsford & Kepler, supra note 22, at 7. See Berliner & Barbieri, The
Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 125 (1984); Note, The
Young Victim as Witness for the Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse? 89 DICK. L. REv. 721
(1985); Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator? 17 NEw
ENG. L. REV. 643 (1982).
24. Harshbarger, Botsford & Kepler, supra note 22, at 7.
25. See Avery, supra note 9, at 3.
The study of the damaging psychological effects of legal proceedings, on a child vic-
tim, the so-called "legal process trauma" is exceptionally difficult, since subjects of
this kind of study are already suspected of suffering from either a:
1) Prior Personality Defect - even if mental trauma is observed immediately after the
occurrence of the offense, it may well be either a latent or an overt emotional
disturbance in the victim which existed prior to the sexual offense.
2) Crime Trauma - is the psychological damage directly resulting from the offense.
Some factors which are involved in a sexual offense are more likely than others to
cause mental trauma to the child victim, e.g., the use of force against the victim.
It is evident from the studies of Landis, Gagnon, and Brunold, that serious sexual
assaults on children have a very high incidence of physical or mental damage,
resulting in long-term institutionalization. According to Landis and Gagnon,
80% of the coerced victims suffered permanent or serious damage.
(3) Environmental Reaction Trauma - is a psychological ill-effect attributed to the
reaction, opinion and behavior of adults not in official positions and also of the
victim's peers. A common finding in studies concerning child victims is that
sexual offenses which are followed by disclosure of the facts to the parents are
generally more traumatic than offenses which have not been reported to anyone.
Id. See also People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 1023, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977, 982.
26. Avery, supra note 9, at 3.
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For instance, in Commonwealth v. Ludwig,2 7 a six-year-old girl, who was
sexually abused by her father, testified at the preliminary hearing that she
was abused. She could not describe the sexual acts in front of her father,
however, because she was afraid of him.28 She was psychiatrically evaluated
a week after her unsuccessful attempt at testifying in front of her father. The
psychiatrist, after observing "signs of increased apprehension and fear" in
the child, determined that she was psychologically injured as a result of the
experience and recommended that she undergo therapy.
29
In State v. Sheppard, a forensic psychiatrist interviewed the child victim to
determine whether she would be able to testify in open court in the presence
of the defendant, her stepfather.3 ° In the interview the child said she was
willing to testify in court. 3 ' Her willingness, however, stemmed from the
fact that she wanted to send her stepfather, "who had threatened to kill her
if she revealed his activities," to jail to insure her protection.32 The child
believed her stepfather would not be sentenced to jail if she testified through
the use of video equipment.33
Although in the psychiatrist's opinion the victim would be able to testify
truthfully and was well-oriented with a good memory, he predicted that if
she testified in court in front of the defendant she would suffer serious long-
lasting emotional effects.3 4 The "[p]robable long-range emotional conse-
quences resulting from [the child's] in-court testimony would be the contin-
ued presence of fear, guilt, and anxiety .... Possible long-term effects of [the
child's] testimony in court would be nightmares, depression, eating, sleeping
and school problems, behavioral difficulties, including 'acting out', and sex-
ual promiscuity.,
3 1
The fact that the trial process, including testifying in front of the defend-
ant, is traumatic to the child witness, has a direct adverse effect on the prose-
cution of child sex abuse cases. In most cases, the child witness is not strong
enough emotionally to testify at all; or, if the child does testify in front of the
defendant, his testimony is "hesitant, forgetful and inconsistent."'3 6 In addi-
tion, the prosecutor may decide not to pursue a case further because the
child's testimony is the only evidence of the crime and children are generally
27. 366 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987).
28. Id. at 370, 531 A.2d at 463.
29. Id.






36. People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 1023, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977, 982 (1986).
Coy v. Iowa
perceived to be "incompetent, unreliable or otherwise not credible wit-
nesses."37 Children who do appear to be competent witnesses "often cannot,
will not, or are not allowed to testify due to the very real psychological harm
that results from forcing the child to repeat the terrifying experience before
the entire courtroom which includes the defendant."3"
Several courts have also recognized the prosecutorial problems caused by
the fact that young children can be easily traumatized and confused in the
courtroom.39 The court in State v. Sheppard stated:
great harm befalls the victims of child abuse. It destroys lives and
damages our society. Known abusers are not being prosecuted be-
cause evidence against them cannot be presented. Children who
are prevailed upon to testify may be more damaged by their trau-
matic role in the court proceedings than they were by their abuse.'
In People v. Algarin,41 the court decided, after observing the child, that a
five-year-old girl was a vulnerable witness, and would only be able to testify
through the use of closed-circuit television. The court described the child's
experience in the court room as the following:
she was visibly frightened by the jury, the defendant and the entire
courtroom setting; that she was unable to answer any questions
other than the neutral questions asked of her outside the jury's
presence... ; that she had left the courtroom clutching her mother
and crying hysterically and that the hysteria continued for a time
thereafter; that she expressed terror of the defendant and that
therefore she was suffering and would continue to suffer great
mental and emotional harm unless her testimony was taken outside
of the jury's and defendant's presence.42
As a result of the combination of a lack of evidence in child sex abuse
cases and the difficulties in obtaining adequate testimony from the victims,
many prosecutions are dismissed or resolved through plea bargaining,
"either because the child's emotional condition prevents him/her from testi-
fying or makes the testimony obviously inaccurate or inadequate.
4 3
37. State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 372, 389 N.W.2d 575, 579 (1986).
38. Id.
39. Handling Evidence and Testimony in Child Abuse Cases, JUDGES J, 2 (Fall 1984);
Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981); Commonwealth
v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d (Ky. 1986); Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987);
State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411,484 A.2d 1330 (1984); People v. Henderson, 132 Misc.
2d 51, 509 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1986); People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977
(1986); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987).
40. 197 N.J. Super. at 431, 484 A.2d at 1342.
41. 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1986).
42. Id. at 1019, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
43. State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 417, 484 A.2d 1330, 1333 (1984). Two attor-
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"Despite the debate surrounding the scope of the rights conferred by the
confrontation clause, one proposition remains undisputed. The essential
purpose of the confrontation clause is truth-finding."'  The use of video for
the child's testimony increases the probability of obtaining truthful testi-
mony.45 While the child's testimony is essential to prosecution, children are
known to be unhelpful witnesses. 46 Children's poor performance as wit-
nesses is-attributed to the fact that they have a "subjective sense of time, an
inaccurate memory ... and [a] limited ability to communicate what they do
not understand and recall."47 These limitations, which affect the child's
ability to testify, magnify during times when the child is "afraid or under
neys who are experienced in the prosecution of child abuse cases testified to the difficulties in
presenting children's testimony. The first attorney testified that in most cases the victim could
not testify in court face-to-face with the accused and other relatives. Id. The victim either
refused to testify or "froze when she got to court." Id. Children who did testify in a prelimi-
nary hearing or before the grand jury, "frequently forgot details, changed stories or presented
inconsistent facts. Ultimately many broke down, cried, ignored questions and eventually re-
fused to answer." Id. Out of up to 40 of these cases handled for the state, the attorney was
only able to complete a trial in one.
The other attorney had reviewed approximately 80 child abuse cases. He testified that nearly
90% of the cases were dismissed as a result of problems attending the testimony of children
who could not handle the possibility of facing a crowd of relatives and strangers in the court-
room. Id. The following are three child abuse cases which illustrate the problems.
1) A twelve-year-old child was the victim of a strangers' sexual molestation. The
facts did not become known to the prosecutor (often the case) until the child
reached the age of 17. The case was dismissed on the basis of psychiatric advice
that the child could not testify without having a complete emotional breakdown.
The child's approach to emotional survival, typically, had been to forget, forget,
forget. Reinforcing her memory of this traumatic event would have been
devastating.
2) A seven-year-old boy was abused by a friend. He was precocious and articulate
when speaking to the prosecuting attorney. When presented to the grand jury,
the presence of many people made him hesitant, forgetful and inconsistent.
Shortly afterward, for unknown reasons, he and his family moved to Italy and the
matter was resolved by a plea agreement.
3) A father was charged with sexually abusing his daughter. The child found it very
difficult to articulate the facts, and refused to discuss them with anyone except the
prosecuting attorney. The complaint was therefore dismissed; the necessary facts
could not be presented to the grand jury.
Id.
44. Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 509, 530 A.2d 275, 281 (1987).
45. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. at 434, 484 A.2d at 1344. The court stated "the ambivalent
position in which the child must find himself, her fear, guilt, and anxiety, become doubly
oppressive when she is subjected to the courtroom atmosphere. Those factors become less
burdensome through the use of video." Id.
46. Id. (quoting Proving Parent-Child Incest.: Proof at Trial Without Testimony in Court by
The Victim, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 131, 137 (1981)).
47. Id. For a discussion of children's credibility, see People v. Chaten, 32 Ill. 2d 416, 206
N.E.2d 697 (1965); People v. Price, 33 Misc. 2d 476, 226 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1962).
Coy v. Iowa
emotional stress."4 Testifying in a courtroom puts the child in a fearful and
stressful situation and, as a result, produces unreliable evidence. 9 Therefore
using video to present children's testimony, "enhances the quality of a child
victim's testimony, [and] serves the essential demand for truth while satisfy-
ing the constitutional mandate." 5 °
II. THE STATE LEGISLATURE'S RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM
In an effort to reduce the trauma experienced by young child victims of
sexual abuse in the courtroom, many state legislatures have enacted statutes
authorizing alternate procedures for testimony by these children."' In fact,
the movement to protect child victims of sexual abuse from further trauma
in the courtroom has increased rapidly in the past few years.
In 1980, only four states permitted the use of pre-trial depositions in lieu
of live testimony by child witnesses.5 2 Today, thirty-three states permit a
videotaped deposition or pre-trial testimony to be presented at trial.5 3 Half
of the states have authorized the use of one or two-way closed circuit televi-
sion to transmit the child's testimony and image live into the courtroom. 4
Eighteen of these states specifically provide that the child will not see or hear
48. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. at 434, 484 A.2d at 1344 (quoting Proving Parent-Child




51. ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1988);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987); MASS. GEN. L. ch.
278 § 16D(b)(l) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4(b) (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1988). See also Handling Evidence and Tesii-
mony in Child Abuse Cases, supra, note 39, at 2. "These new reforms, [court decisions and
legislative actions] which primarily benefit prosecutors, are a response to a growing public
awareness about child abuse and the realization that often the only witness to crimes against
children are the children themselves. Because young children are easily traumatized and con-
fused, some courts have created special provisions to elicit their testimony." Id.
52. McDaniel, Child Trauma Aid, 71 A.B.A. J. 33 (May 1985).
53. Coyle, Application of Confrontation Clause: A Difficult Issue In Child Abuse Cases, 10
NAT'L L.J. 1, 11 (Nov. 2, 1987). The following states permit video taped depositions'or prior
testimony at trial: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. Fifteen of these states permit the defendant to be in the room with the child
during the making of the videotape but hidden from the child's view. Id.
54. Id. States sanctioning one-way systems generally permit the child to testify in a sepa-
rate room in which only the judge, counsel, technicians, and in some cases the defendant are
present. The child's testimony is broadcast into the courtroom for viewing by the jury. Two-
way systems permit the child witness to see the courtroom and the defendant over a video
monitor. Id.
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the defendant while testifying." Currently, Iowa is the only state authoriz-
ing the use of a screen between the defendant and witness in order to block
the witness's view of the defendant.56 Such a screen was used in Coy. While
the legislative efforts work to protect child witnesses from further trauma,
the judiciary has been left to struggle with the question of whether these
protections violate the defendant's confrontation right.
III. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him ... , The confrontation clause is
held to be a fundamental right to which the states are subject through the
fourteenth amendment.5" As early as 1895, however, the United States
Supreme Court recognized that the right to confrontation "must occasion-
ally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the
case."
59
Recently, in Lee v. Illinois, the Court set out three distinct functions of
confrontation. 60 First, confrontation "insures that the witness will give his
[or her] statements under oath - thus impressing him or her with the serious-
ness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty
for peIjury. ' 61 Second, confrontation "forces the witness to submit to cross
examination, the 'greatest legal engine' for the discovery of truth. ' 62 Third,
confrontation "permits the jury... to observe the demeanor of the witness
55. Id. at 11. These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, and Vermont.
56. 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2804 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
58. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965).
59. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). The witness in this case testified at
the first trial but died before the retrial could take place. The Court stated, "[t]he law in its
wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an
incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused." Id.
60. 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). Previ-
ously in Mattox, the Court stated that the primary object of the confrontation clause is to
prevent depositions or ex-parte affidavits from being used against a person in lieu of personal
examination and cross-examination of a witness. Mattox, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895). These
examinations offer the accused an opportunity not only to test the recollection and sift the
conscience of a witness, but also compel the witness to stand face-to-face with the jury. This
direct contact with the jury allows them to observe the witness and judge, by his demeanor on
the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony, whether he is worthy of belief. Id.
at 242-43.
61. Lee, 476 U.S. at 540.
62. Id. (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
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making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility."63
The "main and essential purpose of confrontation," however, is to secure the
opportunity of cross-examination.'
While face-to-face confrontation is the preferred method of presenting tes-
timony at trial,65 there is no constitutional right to confrontation,66 and "no
case has held eye contact to be a requirement.",67 The Supreme Court has
held that an opportunity to cross examine the witness can satisfy the con-
frontation clause even if the witness does not physically confront the defend-
ant.6' Therefore, the preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial is not
"absolute and inelastic," 69 but rather, allows many exceptions.7"
The many accepted exceptions to the literal interpretation of the confron-
tation clause illustrate that the Court has "never embraced the view that the
right of confrontation unconditionally mandates that all witnesses" must tes-
tify in the presence of the accused and confront him or her face-to-face. 71
To the contrary, the Supreme Court has said that "a technical adherence to
the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally be carried farther
than is necessary to the just protection of the accused, and farther than the
safety of the public will warrant.,
72
A number of lower courts have followed the reasoning that the confronta-
tion clause does not demand an "eyeball-to-eyeball" encounter between the
63. Id.
64. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (3d ed. 1940); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316
(1974) ("The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purposes of gazing the upon
the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which
cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate
answers."). See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970) ("[t]he right of cross exami-
nation.., provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation require-
ment... "). Id.
65. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980).
66. Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230 (Ky. 1986).
67. State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 432, 484 A.2d 1330, 1343 (1984).
68. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
69. Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. 361, 365, 531 A.2d 459, 461 (1987).
70. Id. As an example of exceptions to the confrontation clause, the Ludwig court cited
the fact that the clause does not "preclude the use of hearsay evidence in criminal trials under
circumstances which otherwise render such evidence reliable." See United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387 (1986) (statement of co-conspirator); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (where
evidence involving former testimony of an unavailable witness bears sufficient "indicia of relia-
bility"); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (statement of co-conspirator); Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (former testimony); Williams v. Melton, 733 F.2d 1492 (1 1th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984) (out-of-court statement of witness falling under res gestae
exception); Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071
(1984) (excited utterance).
71. Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. at 365, 531 A.2d at 461.
72. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242. See also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
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accusing witness and the accused in cases involving child sexual abuse.7 3
The courts have reasoned that the "protection of minor victims of sex crimes
from further trauma and embarrassment" is a compelling government inter-
est. 7a Those courts which have considered the use of alternative forms of
testimony to protect a child witness from the traumatic effects of testifying in
the physical presence of his or her abuser have generally found there to be no
violation of confrontation guarantees. 7
IV. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE APPLIED TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
A. Courts Denying the Use of Procedures Designed
to Protect Child Witnesses
Courts that have disallowed alternative testimonial procedures designed to
reduce the trauma of child victims of sexual abuse on the witness stand have
followed several different lines of reasoning.
1. Taking The Clause Literally.
The California Court of Appeals in Herbert v. Superior Court was the first
court to decide the narrow issue of whether to allow an exception to the
confrontation clause in order to protect a child victim of sexual assault from
trauma while testifying. The court in Herbert took a literal approach to the
clause. 76 At the preliminary hearing the victim was found to be reluctant
and unable to testify.7 7 In response, the trial court arranged the seating so
that the defendant and the witness could not see each other, though the
defendant could hear the witness' testimony.
78
While the appellate court did admit that the circumstances are "delicate
wherein a five-year-old witness is asked to testify to alleged conduct that is
very private and personal," the court held that the defendant's right to con-
73. Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 227-31 (Ky. 1986); People v. Algarin, 129
Misc. 2d 1016, 1021, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977, 981 (1986).
74. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
75. State v. Johnson, 240 Kan. 326, 729 P.2d 1169 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1071
(1987); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986); Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md.
496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987); Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784 (1988); State v.
Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984); People v. Henderson, 132 Misc. 2d 51,
503 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1986); People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1986);
Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987).
76. 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981). The defendant was charged with oral
copulation and other lewd acts upon his five-year-old step-daughter. Id.
77. Id. at 664, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 851. The trial court concluded that the child was "dis-
turbed by the number of people in the courtroom and in particular with the presence of the
defendant." Id.
78. Id. The defendant was seated in front of and to the side of the bench with the judge in
the jury box and the child in the witness stand.
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frontation had been violated because the defendant and the child witness
could not view each other during the hearing.79 Although the Herbert court
recognized that the right to confrontation is not absolute, it did not find
room for an exception on the facts before it.8 ° A later court, in ruling in
favor of a child witness testifying via closed circuit television, noted that the
Herbert court did not consider the use of video testimony or any problems
unique to child witnesses.8"
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 2
which was decided just sixteen days before Coy was handed down, also took
a literal approach to the confrontation clause. The court ruled out admitting
any testimony by an available witness given outside the presence of the de-
fendant."3 The Bergstrom court struck down the state statute designed to
protect child witnesses from courtroom trauma as unconstitutional.8 4 The
court indicated that to interpret the words of the constitution as requiring
only that the defendant be able to see and hear the witness would "render[]
superfluous the words 'to meet' and 'face-to-face'." 5
Therefore, despite the fact that the Bergstrom court recognized the plight
of child witnesses in sexual assault cases and the legitimate concern sur-
rounding the difficulties such children may face testifying in court, it con-
cluded that "[t]he right of the accused to be tried in the manner which our
Constitution guarantees cannot dissolve under the pressures of changing so-
79. Id. at 669, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
80. Id. at 668, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
81. State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 425, 484 A.2d 1330, 1338 (1984).
82. 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d 366 (1988).
83. Id. at 540-41, 524 N.E.2d at 370. The two child witnesses testified in a room other
than the courtroom. The only people in the room with the child witnesses were the judge, the
prosecutor, defense counsel, the girls' grandmother and a video technician. The defendant was
able to observe the testimony from a television monitor inside the courtroom and also enjoy
two-way communication with his counsel.
84. Id. at 546-47, 524 N.E.2d at 374. The court stated, "Iflor constitutional purposes, no
principled distinction can be drawn between a child witness and any other class whom the
Legislature might in the future deem in need of special treatment. General Laws c. 278 § 16D
creates a rule that is too broad to pass constitutional muster." Id. (The Massachusetts court
resolved the issue solely under Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights) Id. at
540 n.8, 524 N.E.2d at 370 n.8.
85. Id. at 542, 524 N.E.2d at 371. The Bergstrom court also ruled out the use of testi-
mony by electronic means outside the presence of the jury in this case because the Common-
wealth did not show a compelling need for the procedure. The court said that such a need
could be shown where, "by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the recording of the testimony of
a child witness outside the courtroom, (but in the presence of the defendant) is shown to be
necessary so as to avoid severe and long lasting trauma to the child." Id. at 547, 524 N.E.2d at
376. In this case, the court was also concerned that the witness was not made aware that she
was giving testimony against the accused in a court of law. There was no evidence the child
knew the defendant would be watching and listening. Id. at 540, 524 N.E.2d at 370.
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cial circumstance or societal focus."
8 6
2. Requirement of a Specific, Individual Need for Protection
Both the Nebraska State Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals also disallowed the use of closed-circuit television testimony by a child
witness in a sexual assault case as a violation of the defendant's confronta-
tion right in State v. Warford87 and Wildermuth v. State"8 respectively. Un-
like the Herbert and Bergstrom decisions, the Nebraska and Maryland courts
did not rule out the alternative procedure, but rather held that the state must
show "a compelling need to protect the child witness from further injury. '"89
The Maryland Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the statute
allowing for the closed-circuit testimony was unconstitutional as a violation
of the confrontation clause.90 The Wildermuth court reversed and re-
manded one of the lower court decisions on the grounds that the state had
not met the statutory threshold. To meet the threshold requirement, the
state must make a particularized showing that if the individual child testifies
in the courtroom it "will result in the child suffering serious emotional dis-
tress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate."'" This threshold
showing is essential before invoking the statute allowing for closed-circuit
92testimony.
Both the Maryland and Nebraska courts required more than a general
compelling interest before granting the requested testimonial safeguard. The
one seeking protection on behalf of the child must prove a need for the pro-
tection that is specific to the particular child whose testimony is sought.93
The Maryland court emphasized that "there can be no more justification for
excusing all child victims from testifying than for imposing the duty on all of
86. Id. at 553, 524 N.E.2d at 377.
87. 223 Neb. 368, 389 N.W.2d 575 (1986).
88. 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987). This case consisted of the combined appeals of
two separate jury trials for the sexual abuse of children in two unrelated incidents in which the
children were allowed to testify via live closed-circuit television.
89. Warford, 223 Neb. at 376, 389 N.W.2d at 581.
90. Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 520, 530 A.2d at 287.
91. Id. (appellant James Sylvester McKoy, for whom the court of appeals upheld the
closed-circuit television testimony, did not challenge the procedure on the ground that the
prerequisite condition of emotional unavailability had not been established).
92. Id. at 519, 530 A.2d at 286. The Nebraska Supreme Court's standard, similar to this
threshold, requires a "particularized showing on the record that the child would be further
traumatized or was intimidated by testifying in the courtroom in front of the defendant."
Warford, 223 Neb. at 377, 389 N.W.2d at 581.
93. Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 519, 530 A.2d at 286. The court found that the expert used
to prove the child's inability to testify spoke in terms of any child and not specifically of the
particular potential child witness.
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them. Each case merits its own individual decision."9 4 The courts also re-
quired that once this particularized showing of need is made the use of the
new evidentiary tool should be carried out in the least intrusive manner.95
B. Courts Upholding the Use of Procedures Designed
to Protect Child Witnesses
Courts allowing alternative testimonial procedures designed to protect
child sexual abuse victims from being further traumatized when testifying in
the presence of the defendant have uniformly used a balancing test in decid-
ing to admit the witnesses' testimony. The courts balanced the emotional
well-being of the child witness against the confrontation right of the defend-
ant in an effort to not significantly impair either.
In State v. Sheppard,96 a prosecution for the sexual abuse of the defend-
ant's ten-year-old stepdaughter and the first published case concerning
closed-circuit testimony of a child witness,97 the Superior Court of New
Jersey found the video procedure did not significantly impair the rights of
the defendant. 98 The court weighed the "confrontation right of the defend-
ant against the 'right' of a child victim to testimonial protection." 99 In rec-
ognizing that the risk face-to-face testimony presented to the witness was too
great to be allowed, the court stated that "[t]he concern which the court
must have for her, and for all children, dictates a different course, when that
course will not significantly impair the rights of the defendant. ' ' 1° °
94. Id. Similarly, People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 1018-19 n.4, 498 N.Y.S.2d 911,
979-80 n.4, involved 15 different child victims, the court ruled that only three of the victims
were "sufficiently vulnerable to justify" having the witness testify via closed-circuit television.
Id.
95. Warford, 223 Neb. at 377, 389 N.W.2d at 581. The Nebraska court in Warford found
deficiencies in the manner in which the procedure was implemented. The defendant did not
have a means of communicating with his attorney during the testimony and the judge was not
able to control the examination by interrupting the questioning to rule on objections. Id.
96. 197 N.J. Super. 411, 489 A.2d 1330 (1984).
97. See also Comment, Face-to Television Screen-to Face: Testimony by Closed Circuit Tel-
evision Cases of Alleged Child Abuse and the Confrontation Right, 6 KY. L.J. 273 (1987-88).
While this Comment discusses the same narrow issue of the confrontation clause and child
victims of sexual abuse as witnesses, it takes the opposite stance. The author.maintains that
the confrontation clause is absolute and attempts to lessen the trauma experienced by children
in court.
98. 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984).
99. Id. at 441, 484 A.2d at 1348.
100. Id. at 443, 484 A.2d at 1343. The Kentucky Supreme Court in deciding Common-
wealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d. 224 (Ky. 1986) agreed with this rationale of the Sheppard court
and stated that the "exception to the confrontation clause is far outweighed by the inability to
effectively prosecute child abusers where the evidence against them cannot be presented with-
out intimidation." Id. at 229. In reversing the trial court, Kentucky's highest court upheld
the closed circuit television testimony of a five-year-old girl sexually abused by her uncle. The
1990]
426 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 6:411
In Sheppard, by using the video procedure the child would not see the
defendant or be in the courtroom at all. The defendant, the jury and every-
one else in the courtroom, however, could see and hear the witness while she
testified. Also, the defendant was able to cross-examine the witness.' ° ' The
court characterized this procedure as a "modest erosion of the clause," with
"enough to satisfy the demands of the confrontation clause."' 2
The Sheppard court distinguished Herbert by pointing out that in the Cali-
fornia case the defendant could not see the witness.'03 The court also
pointed out that the Herbert decision, finding a violation of the confrontation
clause, was "motivated in part by the fact that there was no record showing
that the child's conduct required the arrangement, no record of any intimi-
dating action by the defendant, no oath taken by the victim and no request
from either party to make a special arrangement." 1 0 4
In 1986, two New York courts also upheld the use of live closed-circuit
testimony. The court permitted the testimony of emotionally traumatized
child victims of sexual abuse over defendants' objections that the procedure
violated their confrontation rights.'0 5 The New York courts used a balanc-
ing test similar to that of the New Jersey court in Sheppard. In both cases,
the New York Court of Appeals held that the compelling state interest of
protecting the emotional well being of child sex offense victims and the need
for their testimony to ensure successful prosecutions "more than outweigh
any infringement of defendant's right of confrontation ....... 06
In Henderson, the New York court emphasized that the state must meet
the statutory burden of proving that it is likely,
court declared the state statute permitting television cameras to present testimony of sex abuse
victims under the age of 12 to be constitutional. Id.
101. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. at 432, 484 A.2d at 1343.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 425, 484 A.2d at 1338.
104. Id. Sheppard included a record of the problems the child experienced, which was
supported by a psychiatric opinion that "emotional damage could be caused by in-court testi-
mony," the witness testified under oath and the prosecutor specifically requested that the
child's testimony be taken with the aid of video equipment. Id.
105. People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016,498 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1986); People v. Henderson,
132 Misc. 2d 51, 503 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1986). The two-way closed circuit television procedure
was implemented pursuant to a statute which amended the criminal procedure law by adding
Article 65 on July 24, 1985 and was effective immediately. The statute permits a child witness
in a sexual abuse case, who is twelve years-old or less, to testify from a comfortable and less
formal testimonial room via live two-way closed-circuit television. Henderson, 132 Misc. 2d at
56, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
106. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d at 1024, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 983; Henderson, 132 Misc. 2d at 53,
503 N.Y.S.2d at 240. The Henderson case, decided three months after the Algarin decision,
agreed with the court's reasoning concerning the constitutionality of the testimonial
procedure.
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as'a result of extraordinary circumstances that such child witness
will suffer severe mental or emotional harm if required to testify at
a criminal proceeding without the use of live, two-way closed cir-
cuit television and that the use of such live, two-way closed circuit
television will help prevent, or diminish the likelihood or extent of
such harm.
0 7
This statutory burden must be met in each case in order to have the child
witness declared vulnerable and therefore be permitted to use the procedure.
Pennsylvania also upheld the closed-circuit testimony of a child victim of
sexual abuse in Commonwealth v. Ludwig. °8 The Ludwig court followed
the previous cases in balancing and relaxed the requirements of the confron-
tation clause "only where it is necessary because of a compelling interest" as
long as the infringement is as "minimally intrusive as possible."'"° Accord-
ing to the Ludwig court, by upholding the testimony done by closed circuit
television, it "did nothing more than adopt modem technological means to
allow the jury to hear testimony which otherwise have been unavailable ....
It served only to enhance the fact-finding process."" 0 The child's closed-
circuit testimony had all the elements of conventional testimony. The de-
fendant and jury could observe the witness while she testified, she was under
oath and the defendant had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination.
In the court's opinion, the only variations in the closed circuit testimony
from conventional testimony were that the witness was in a different room
and that she "was not required to look at the defendant [while]
testifying." 1'
The alternative testimonial procedures used by courts in an effort to re-
duce the emotional stress on children have been implemented in a manner
which preserves the other essential elements of confrontation as set out by
Lee v. Illinois."2 The jury is able to observe the witness' demeanor, the
testimony is taken under oath and the defendant is afforded an opportunity
for cross-examination.
In deciding Coy v. Iowa, the Supreme Court construed the sixth amend-
107. Henderson, 132 Misc. 2d at 56, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 242. This statutory burden is very
similar to the threshold used by the Maryland court in Wildermuth and the requirement by the
Nebraska Supreme Court in Warford. All require a showing that the particular child witness
will suffer emotionally if forced to give traditional in-court testimony in front of the defendant.
See id. Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 520, 530 A.2d at 287; Warford, 223 Neb. at 376, 389 N.W.2d
at 581.
108. 366 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987).
109. Id. at 369, 531 A.2d at 463.
110. Id. at 371-72, 531 A.2d at 464.
111. Id. at 363, 531 A.2d at 460.
112. 476 U.S. 530 (1986). See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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ment's confrontation clause and applied a line of reasoning similar to that of
the state courts which have disallowed alternative testimonial procedures.
The product of this analysis is that the right to confront one's accusers face-
to-face is considered fundamental to the confrontation clause.
V. THE Coy DECISION
The defendant in Coy was charged with sexually assaulting two 13-year-
old girls while they were sleeping in a makeshift tent in one of the girl's
backyard next door to him.' 13 The girls claimed that, their attacker awak-
ened them when he came into their tent in the early morning.' 1 4 The at-
tacker, whose face was concealed by a stocking, shined a flashlight into their
eyes and told them not to look at him." 5 He then fondled both girls and
forced them to perform oral sex.' 16 Neither child was able to describe his
face. 1
7
The state moved, pursuant to a recently enacted state statute which cre-
ates a legislatively imposed presumption of trauma, to allow the victims to
testify either by closed-circuit television or from behind a screen.18 The
trial court permitted the use of a screen placed between the defendant and
the child witnesses during their testimony.' After adjusting the lighting in
the courtroom, the screen enabled the defendant to perceive the witnesses
dimly while the witnesses could not see the defendant at all.
120
The Iowa State Supreme Court rejected the defendant's confrontation
clause argument on the ground that, since the ability to cross-examine the
witness was not impaired by the screen, there was no violation of the con-
frontation clause. 12' The Supreme Court then granted a writ for
113. 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2799 (1988).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Note, To Keep The Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 437
(1989).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 444. The statute provides in part:
The court may require a party be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or
mirror that permits the party to see and hear the child during the child's testimony,
but does not allow the child to see or hear the party. However, if a party is so
confined, the court shall take measures to insure that the party and counsel can con-
fer during the testimony and shall inform the child that the party can see and hear
the child during the testimony.
IOWA CODE § 910A.14(l) (1987).
119. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799.
120. Id.
121. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 733-34 (1986). The Iowa Supreme Court also rejected
the defendant's due process argument on the ground that the screening procedure was not




The majority in Coy123 interpreted the sixth amendment confrontation
clause literally when it held that a screen placed between the defendant and
two young witnesses violated the defendant's right to confrontation. Yet, in
Ohio v. Roberts the Supreme Court rejected a literal interpretation of the
confrontation clause as "unintended and too extreme." '124 The Coy majority
stated that there is "something deep in human nature that regards face-to-
face confrontation between accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in
a criminal prosecution.' ,,125 To illustrate this point the majority cited Presi-
dent Eisenhower's description of face-to-face confrontation as part of the
code of his home town of Abilene, Kansas,126 along with other literary refer-
ences. At the same time, however, the majority pointed out that the "con-
frontation clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes upon
the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere."' 127 While the court recog-
nized that a confrontation with the accused may "upset the truthful rape
victim or abused child" it pointed out that it may also "confound and undo
the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a
truism that constitutional protections have costs. "128
Although the majority also recognized that there have been cases in which
it has held that the right to confrontation is "not absolute and may give way
to other important interests," 129 it pointed out that the rights at issue in
122. Coy v. Iowa, 483 U.S. 1019 (1987).
123. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
124. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
125. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. at 2801 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
126. Id. (citing Pollit, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB.
L. 381, 384-87 (1959)):
The Abilene code made it a necessity to '[m]eet anyone face to face with whom you
disagree. You could not sneak up on him from behind, or do any damage to him,
without suffering the penalty of outraged citizenry .... In this county, if someone
dislikes you, or accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the
shadow.'
Id.
127. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. While the witness is not compelled to make eye
contact with the defendant, the majority states that trier of fact will draw its own conclusions
from the witness' choice. Id.
128. Id. "Because children, like adults, are not always scrupulously honest and accurate in
their narrations, courts are alert to detect fantasy and falsehood in any testimony, and child-
victim complainants in sex offense cases, being children, raise special problems of their own."
Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 977, 1003 (1969).
129. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801.
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those cases "were not the rights narrowly and explicitly set forth in the
Clause, but rather rights that are, or were, asserted to be reasonably im-
plicit.",13 0 The majority said that upholding these earlier exceptions is not
the same as "holding that we can identify exceptions, in light of other impor-
tant interests, to the irreducible literal meaning of the clause: a right to meet
face-to-face all those who appear and give evidence at trial."
'131
Supreme Court cases show that prior to the availability of television, con-
frontation generally involved a face-to-face meeting with one's adversa-
ries.' 32 While modem cases also use the term "face-to-face,"' 33 there is an
argument that these words refer to the right to cross-examine the witness
rather than actually physically confront him, and that the particular lan-
guage of the court "may have resulted from its inability to foresee technolog-
ical developments" which allow cross examination without actual physical
confrontation. 134 It is recognized that the drafters of the Constitution did
not and could not have imagined or planned for the technological advances
utilized in courtrooms today in an effort to reduce the trauma experienced
by children involved in legal proceedings. 135
The state in Coy maintained that the important interest, which must be
demonstrated before the rights in the confrontation clause give way, is estab-
lished by the statute which imposes a legislative presumption of trauma.'
1 6
However, the majority in disallowing the screen emphasized that something
more than the type of generalized finding in the statute is needed when the
exception is not "firmly... rooted in our jurisprudence."' 137 The court con-
cluded that because there had been "no individual findings that these partic-
ular witnesses needed special protection," the procedure could not be
130. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2802. The Court noted that these implicit rights include the
right to cross-examine. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 750 (1987) (asserted right to
face-to-face confrontation'at some point in the proceedings other than the trial itself); Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-65 (1980) (the right to exclude out-of-court statements); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
131. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
132. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); United States v. Benfield, 593
F.2d 815, 819 (8th Cir. 1979).
133. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
134. Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative In-
novations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 823 n.108 (1985).
135. Coyle, supra note 53, at I. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) ("The Con-
frontation Clause does not guarantee presence for presence's sake. The right to confront or to
be present is ancillary to the right to test the reliability of evidence and thereby to advance the
truth-seeking function.") Id.
136. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
137. Id. (quoting Boujaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) citing Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)).
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upheld. 138
B The Effect of Coy
The question now is how will the decision in Coy affect the state statutes
designed to protect child victims of sexual abuse from trauma as well as the
state court decisions which have upheld these alternative procedures. The
majority left a small opening in the door, seemingly closed to alternative
testimonial procedures, that may supply the answer. The Court stated,
"[w]e leave for another day, however, the question whether any exceptions
exist. Whatever they may be, they would surely be allowed only when neces-
sary to further an important public policy.' 139 Both the concurrence by
Justice O'Connor and a state court case considering the issue following the
Coy decision " used these words as an opportunity to leave hope for the
future of the legislative and judicial protections for child witnesses enacted
around the country.
Justice O'Connor penned her concurrence specifically to note that con-
frontation rights are "not absolute but rather may give way in an appropri-
ate case to other competing interests so as to permit the use of certain
procedural devices designed to shield a child witness from the trauma of
courtroom testimony."'' She emphasized that nothing in the majority
opinion dooms efforts by state legislatures to protect child witnesses.' 42 She
explicitly stated that it is "not novel to recognize that a defendant's 'right
physically to face those who testify against him,' even if located at the 'core'
of the Confrontation Clause, is not absolute, and I reject any suggestion to
the contrary in the Court's opinion."' 43
The concurrence clearly states that the protection of child witnesses is an
important public policy which would call for something other than face-to-
face confrontation. It is possible Justice O'Connor sees this protection as the
same important public policy which the majority refers to as a possible ex-
138. Id. The majority states'that "[t]he exception created by the Iowa statute, which was
passed in 1985, could hardly be viewed as firmly rooted. Since there have been no individual-
ized findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection .... Id.
139. Id.
140. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784 (1988).
141. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 2804. ("Initially many such procedures may raise no substantial Confrontation
Clause problem since they involve testimony in the presence of the defendant.") Id. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1987) (one-way closed-circuit television; defendant must be in
same room as witness); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-
8-55 (Supp. 1987) (one-way closed circuit television; defendant must be in same room as wit-
ness); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (two-way closed circuit
television).
143. 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ception left for "another day." 1" The focus, however, would be on the ne-
cessity prong of the test and a court must make a case-specific finding of a
need for an alternative method of presenting testimony for the strictures of
the confrontation clause to give way. 145 Interestingly, while the majority
opinion did make reference to the dissent, there was no effort made on the
part of the majority to dispute these statements made by Justice O'Connor
and concurred with by Justice White. 1
46
Since Coy, several state courts have considered the issue of whether to
admit testimony by children where the witness does not confront the defend-
ant face-to-face. Most of the courts interpreting Coy, in conjunction with
Justice O'Connor's concurrence, have agreed that the decision "does not
preclude, under appropriate circumstances, the use of trial procedures that
supplant physical confrontation at trial."'
14 7
In Maryland, a case decided just five weeks after Coy upheld the use of
closed-circuit television for the presentation of seven-year-old girl's testi-
mony despite the ruling in Coy.' 4 The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land upheld the use of the closed-circuit testimony procedure because it
believed that there had been an adequate specific showing of vulnerability for
the witness in question.'
49
However, this decision was ultimately overruled by Maryland's highest
court.'50 In reversing the lower court the Maryland Court of Appeals ex-
plicitly rejected the contention that Coy held "nothing less than a physical,
face to face courtroom encounter between witness and accused can ever sat-
isfy the constitutional rights of confrontation.""'s' Rather, the reversal was
144. Id. at 2803.
145. Id. at 2804-05.
146. Id. at 2801-02 & n.2.
147. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989) (citing State v. Thomas, 150 Wis.
2d 374, 442 N.W.2d 10 (1989)). See, e.g., State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 768 P.2d 150 (1989);
State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 554 A.2d 277, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2103 (1989); State v.
Thomas, 770 P.2d 1324 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. granted, (1989); Glendening v. State, 536
So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988); Brady v. State, 540 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. 1989); State in Interest of J.D.S.,
436 N.W.2d 342 (Iowa 1989); State v. Eaton, 244 Kan. 370, 769 P.2d 1157 (1989); State v.
Crandall, 231 N.J. Super. 124, 555 A.2d 35 (1989); State in Interest of B.F., 230 N.J. Super.
153, 553 A.2d 40 (1989); State v. Davis, 229 N.J. Super. 66, 550 A.2d 1241 (1988); People v.
Rivera, 141 Misc. 2d 1031, 535 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1988); Ohio v. Eastman, 39 Ohio St. 3d 307, 530
N.E.2d 409 (1988). But see State v. Murray, 375 S.E.2d 405 (W. Va. 1988).
148. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784 (1988).
149. Id. at 282-83, 544 A.2d at 801-02.
150. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989).
151. Id. at 566, 560 A.2d at 1121. Craig concluded that the Supreme Court in Coy requires
that any exceptions to the confrontation clause be construed narrowly. Id. at 562, 560 A.2d at
1125. These exceptions should be construed more narrowly than the Maryland court had
previously held in Wildermuth. See notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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prompted by the fact that the prosecution did not make a showing that the
particular child witness required the use of closed-circuit television for her
emotional protection adequate to meet the "high threshold" required by
Coy. 152
Both the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals in Maryland
believed that the issue the Coy majority chose to reserve for another day was
before it to be decided. 5 ' In Craig, the Court of Appeals answered the ques-
tion by redefining the parameters of the inquiry into a child's need for the
use of alternative testimonial procedures that supplant confrontation. The
court stated that: "[t]he question of whether a child is unavailable to testify
... should not be asked in terms of inability to testify in the ordinary court-
room setting, but in the much narrower terms of the witness's inability to
testify in the presence of the accused."' 54 It is not sufficient to determine the
child's ability to testify in terms of the general courtroom atmosphere. But
rather, any emotional trauma experienced by the child must arise "primar-
ily" from confrontation with the witness. 155
While the Craig court's reading of Coy did require it to reverse the lower
court, the Maryland court did not accept a literal interpretation of the con-
frontation clause and was very clear that a child who meets the threshold of
need will be allowed to testify by closed-circuit testimony.' 56 The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari of Craig and will review the accuracy of this
determination.1
57
Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reconsidered State v. Thomas,
decided one day before Coy, to determine if the Supreme Court's ruling dic-
tated a reversal in that case.' 8 According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
however, the lower court was "remarkably prescient" in "foreshadowing"
the test outlined by Coy. 9 Both Thomas and Coy required "individual find-
ings" that the witness' special circumstances called for "special protection
from further traumatization."'"
As illustrated by the interpretations of both Thomas and Craig, Coy did
not completely close the door to testimonial procedures designed to protect
child victims from additional emotional harm.
152. Id. at 567, 560 A.2d at 1121.
153. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 280, 544 A.2d at 799 (1988); Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 560
A.2d 1123 (1989).
154. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 564, 560 A.2d 1120, 1126 (1989).
155. Id. at 566, 560 A.2d at 1127.
156. Id at 567-68, 560 A.2d at 1128.
157. State v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 834 (1990).
158. 150 Wisc. 2d 374, 442 N.W.2d 10 (1989).
159. Thomas, 150 Wisc. 2d 374, 393, 442 N.W.2d 10, 19 (1989).
160. Id.
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C. The Dissent
The dissenters in Coy, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun,
strongly disagreed with the majority's analysis of the confrontation clause
and concluded that the testimonial procedure used at the trial level was con-
stitutional.1 6 ' According to Blackmun's dissent, the use of the screen to
block the victim's view of the defendant did not interfere with the "purposes
of confrontation."' 62 The essential elements - including having the witness
under oath, the opportunity for cross-examination, and the jury's ability to
observe the witness' demeanor - were all present. 163 Coy's "sole com-
plaint," in the words of the dissent, is the "very narrow objection that the
girls could not see him while they testified about the sexual assault they
endured."'14
Justice Blackmun gave two reasons for his disagreement with the major-
ity. First, the majority did not consider the "minimal extent of infringement
on 'Coy's confrontation rights in determining whether' competing public
policies justify" the trial procedure.' 65 Second, the majority's literal inter-
pretation of the confrontation clause may lead states attempting to make use
of techniques to protect child witnesses to "sacrifice other, more central,
confrontation interests," in an effort to preserve face to face confronta-
tion. 166 The scant support for the majority's interpretation of the confronta-
tion clause, in the dissent's opinion, is obvious from the majority's "reliance
on literature, anecdote and dicta from opinions a majority of this Court did
not join." 1
67
VI. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AFTER COY
Coy has said that the "literal right to confront the witness at the time of
trial" forms the "core of the values furthered by the confrontation clause"
and does not give way to exceptions. 168 The majority in Coy, however, left
open a door to possible exceptions to this literal face-to-face confrontation
by leaving for another day the question of whether any exceptions exist. 169
Since Coy several state courts have attempted to answer this question.
The Craig court made use of this open door by putting its own limit on the
161. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2805 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 2806 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
163. Id at 2805.




168. Id. at 2798, 2801.
169. Id. at 2803.
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threshold required by Coy. Similarly, while Thomas allowed a child witness
to testify through a video-taped deposition in which the defendant was not
present - a procedure seemingly forbidden by Coy. Upon reconsideration,
Thomas held that it was consistent with the Supreme Court's holding. The
Thomas court held this on the basis that the state showed a specific need for
the exception for that particular witness.' 7°
It is likely that in the future other courts wishing to reduce the trauma of
testifying for children will proceed with the use of a protective testimonial
technique only after there has been a specific showing that the witness will be
harmed if he or she testified in the defendant's presence. Courts looking to
allow alternative testimonial procedures to protect child victims of sexual
abuse from further trauma in the courtroom will construe Coy as did Craig
and the concurring justices. These courts will construe the decision as "sim-
ply striking down the procedure used in that case and reserving for further
consideration whether the more common approaches authorized by most of
the States will suffice."" '' Since Coy, state courts are bound to show, at
least, a specific need for each child witness to be protected in order to use
any alternative procedures for presenting their testimony. The decision in
Coy has been a signal to state legislatures and courts to require a specific
showing of need for alternative testimonial procedures and also to tailor stat-
utes to allow for only a slight erosion of the confrontation right. The
Supreme Court's review of Craig will most likely clearly define the limits of
the threshold required by Coy.
Claudia L. Marchese
170. 150 Wisc. 2d 374, 387, 442 N.W.2d 10, 16(1989).
171. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 280, 544 A.2d 784, 799 (1988).
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